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This paper develops an analytically solvable new economic geography model of the
‘footloose entrepreneur’ class in which not only skilled labor is mobile, but also unskilled
labor. Allowing unskilled labor to move freely between diﬀerent regions increases the ag-
glomeration incentive of skilled labor. Depending on the level of unskilled labor mobility,
the geographical distribution of economic activity is either a ‘pitchfork’ or a ‘tomahawk’.
If unskilled labor is very mobile, complete agglomeration is the only stable outcome. When
trade costs are high, skilled and unskilled labor migration reinforce each other leading to
agglomeration of both types of labor in the same region. For lower levels of trade cost,
unskilled labor returns to its region of origin, whereas skilled labor remains concentrated.
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Models of the new economic geography (NEG) need three main ingredients to explain the
agglomeration of economic activity: ﬁrstly, increasing returns to scale and monopolistic com-
petition, secondly, impediments to trade, and thirdly, factor mobility or production linkages.
Standard NEG models with mobile labor as proposed by Krugman (1991), Forslid (1999),
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), Ottaviano et. al. (2002), Pﬂüger (2004) and Pﬂüger and Südekum
(2008a) assume two types of individuals - mobile and immobile workers. Mobile workers are
usually referred to as skilled labor and can move freely between regions. Immobile workers -
usually labeled as unskilled workers - are totally immobile and are bound to their region of ori-
gin. Looking at the empirical side of the coin, it becomes obvious that the assumption of total
immobility of unskilled labor is far from realistic. According to Carrington and Detragiache
(1998) and Docquier and Marfouk (2006) who created two of the most important databases on
international migration and educational attainment, in the year 2000 only 34.6% of the total
stock of migrants in OECD countries had tertiary education (13 years of education and above)
whereas 65.4% were less educated. The facts show unambiguously that unskilled labor migra-
tion is substantial and should not be neglected for simplicity’s sake. But the assumption of
immobile unskilled labor is crucial to these models. From Robert-Nicoud (2003) we know that
if there is no immobile factor of production in a standard NEG framework, complete agglomer-
ation is the only stable outcome. This is intuitive - if there are beneﬁts from agglomeration but
no disadvantages, why then should people be dispersed? And indeed, Helpman (1998) and Mu-
rata (2003) have developed NEG models where labor is perfectly mobile between regions. But
they need to introduce a dispersion force to obtain equilibria diﬀerent from total agglomeration.
Consequently, there are two types of NEG models with mobile labor which represent extremes:
on the hand there are model which assume the total immobility of unskilled labor, on the other
hand there are very few approaches where labor is entirely mobile. The model presented here
is a ﬁrst approach to overcome this gap and develops a synthesis of these extreme cases. More
precisely, it presents an analytically solvable NEG model, in which both skilled and unskilled
labor are mobile. The aim of this essay is to work out the eﬀects mobile unskilled labor adds
to standard NEG labor mobility models. Furthermore, it is a ﬁrst approach to deal with two
1mobile factors of production in a NEG framework. The existing literature has concentrated
on models with one mobile factor - be it a certain type of labor or capital. But other factors
of production have been assumed to be bound to a certain region. Having more than one
’footloose’ input raises interesting questions with respect to their interactions, to the causality
of mobility as well as to the stability of the model equilibria. This paper oﬀers a ﬁrst proposal
to handle these issues.
The novelty of the model presented here is that it assumes unskilled labor to be imperfectly
mobile, instead of being perfectly (im-)mobile. More precisely, this paper accounts for taste
heterogeneity within the working force as proposed by Ludema and Wooton (1999), Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003). In these papers it is assumed that skilled workers can
freely migrate between regions, but have idiosynchronic preferences about locations. According
to Russek (2008) taste heterogeneity is analytically equivalent to the assumption of migration
costs. Consequently, heterogeneous preferences about locations partially impede skilled labor
migration. The unskilled workforce is assumed to be entirely immobile. Diﬀerent from these
papers, the present approach assumes that unskilled labor has heterogeneous tastes and, con-
sequently, incurs costs when migrating from one region to the other. Skilled labor, instead, is
assumed to be perfectly mobile between regions. The latter assumption is not crucial to the
analysis, but is made for two reasons. On the one hand, it helps to isolate the eﬀects mobile
unskilled labor add to this type of new economic geography models. Therefore, it is easier to
compare the results to the literature. And on the other hand, there is a body of empirical
evidence which supports the assumption that skilled people have less mobility costs and have
greater ease to adapt to new regions, cultures, etc. With respect to international migration,
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Docquier and Marfouk (2006) ﬁnd that in most coun-
tries migration rates by educational category are highest for highly educated workers (for some
countries the emigration rate of skilled labor is greater than 80%). Studies about internal mi-
gration come to the same conclusion. In an empirical study about migrants in Spain, Antonlin
and Bover (1997) ﬁnd that the probability of migration increases with the level of education.
Hunt (2000) and Borjas et. al. (1992) report the same for the US and Germany, respectively.
The main results of the model presented are characterized as follows.
Firstly, the mobility of unskilled labor adds an additional agglomeration force. The strength
2of this force is determined by the degree of unskilled labor mobility. Therefore, (partial) ag-
glomeration is stable at higher levels of trade costs in comparison to models where unskilled
labor is immobile. Secondly, the extent of unskilled labor mobility has an eﬀect on the agglom-
eration pattern of skilled labor. If unskilled labor is not mobile at all or relatively immobile,
the agglomeration pattern of skilled labor is a ’pitchfork’ and agglomeration is smooth and
reversible. Consequently, the outcome of Pﬂüger (2004) is replicated. If the unskilled work-
force is relatively mobile, agglomeration forces gain strength so that the resulting bifurcation
pattern is a ’tomahawk’ as described by the seminal core-periphery model by Krugman (1991).
Consequently, we ﬁnd catastrophic agglomeration and hysteresis of skilled labor. If unskilled
workers are very or even perfectly mobile between regions, complete agglomeration of both
types of labor in either region is the only stable equilibrium of the model. This is in keeping
with the above mentioned models by Helpman (1998) and Murata (2003), if these models are
considered without dispersion force. Thirdly, when trade costs are high, the model predicts
synchronous migration ﬂows of both skilled and unskilled labor into the same region. During
this process of agglomeration skilled and unskilled labor migration reinforce each other. During
the ongoing process of economic integration, unskilled labor remigrates to its region of origin
while skilled labor either continuous to agglomerate or remains concentrated. There seems to
be some empirical support for this theoretical phenomenon. In a study about internal migration
in Spain Bover and Velilla (1999) show that rich regions have have become net outmigration
areas, whereas poorer regions are net receivers of migrants. Giannetti (2003) reports that the
high-skilled agglomeration area Silicon Valley loses its unskilled workers. In a study about
international migration Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) ﬁnd that foreign-born return migrants
leaving the US are negatively selected and are seldom among the highly skilled. Cohen and
Haberfeld (2001) ﬁnd that Isrealis returning from the US have been less successful in terms
of income than those remaining. Reagan and Olsen (2000) concentrate on the length of stays
of US immigrants. They come to the conclusion that the length of stay increases with the
level of education. Bauer and Gang (1998) and Steiner and Velling (1994) support this result
in studies on migrants from Egypt and migrants in Germany, respectively. And fourthly, as
unskilled labor is mobile, it can react to diﬀerences in real wages. Consequently, unskilled labor
in the periphery is no longer worse oﬀ than unskilled workers in the agglomeration core, which
3is in contrast to models where unskilled labor is immobile. Later in this paper it will be shown,
that migration ﬂows of unskilled workers come to a halt when the diﬀerence in indirect utilities
equals migration costs. The marginal migrant then bears migration costs which set oﬀ the
beneﬁts of being in the agglomeration core. Consequently, unskilled workers remaining in the
periphery can not improve their situation by migration.
To the best of my knowledge the models developed by Helpman (1998) and Murata (2003) are
the only NEG models with mobile labor which neglect the assumption of an immobile factor
production, but which exhibit crucial diﬀerences to the model presented here. In these models
there is only one factor of production which enters the production of goods both as ﬁxed and
variable factor of production, whereas the model presented here assumes two of them. As a
prerequisite for production skilled labor is needed as a ﬁxed factor of production (think of
headquarter services or R&E) and is perfectly mobile, whereas unskilled labor is required in
the production process and is partially mobile. Furthermore, there are diﬀerences with respect
to the homogeneous good (which is usually referred to as agricultural good). Helpman (1998)
assumes that the homogeneous good is exogenously supplied to both regions and is non-tradable
(a stock of housing). Immigration then leads to rising housing prices and, therefore, it serves
as dispersion force. In Murata (2003) there is no such good. In his model dispersion comes
from taste heterogeneity of the working force. In contrast to these models, the model in this
paper assumes that the homogeneous good is endogenously supplied and can freely be traded
between the regions.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2.1 to section 2.3 describes the basic assumptions
of the model as well as the preference structure of households and the production side of the
economies. To conclude, the short-run equilibrium is derived for any given distribution of skilled
and unskilled labor. Section 3 is dedicated to the long-run equilibrium of the model where the
breakpoint and the corresponding bifurcation patterns of skilled and unskilled workers are
determined. Section 4 concludes.
42 The model
2.1 The basic set-up
The basic structure of this model is based on the analytically solvable footloose entrepreneur
model developed by Pﬂüger (2004). The crucial diﬀerence to his paper is that unskilled labor
is assumed to be heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile instead of being entirely immobile.
There are two countries in the economy named home (H) and foreign (F). Both countries are
identical with respect to tastes, production technologies and the (initial) endowment of factors
of production. There are two types of households, skilled and unskilled. The world population
of unskilled labor is given by L which is the sum of unskilled labor living in home (LH) and
foreign (LF). The world-wide mass of skilled people is formalized by K and is composed of
skilled people of both regions, KH and KF (the subindex indicates the region of residence).
Each type inelastically supplies one unit of factor input and receives unskilled wages (W) or
skilled wages (R) as income, respectively. This income is entirely spent for the consumption of
goods from which people derive utility. There are two types of goods. The homogeneous good
(A) is produced under perfect competition with a linear constant returns to scale technology
using unskilled labor as the only input. The homogeneous good can be traded without trade
costs and serves as the numéraire. Furthermore, there is a set of heterogeneous goods (X) which
shall be called manufacturing goods. Each variety is produced under monopolistic competition
and increasing returns to scale using both skilled and unskilled labor. Unskilled labor is the
only variable factor of production. The marginal input requirement is constant and is given
by c. Furthermore, each ﬁrm needs one unit of skilled labor as ﬁxed input (e.g., headquarter
services or R&D). Varieties of heterogeneous goods incur trade costs when traded between the
regions, within a region trade is costless.
Unskilled labor is assumed to be mobile across regions, but incurs costs when migrating from
one region to the other. These costs diﬀer between individuals. Skilled labor is perfectly mobile
between regions. Within one region both types of workers are perfectly mobile between sectors.
λ = KH/K and (1−λ) = KF/K express the share of skilled workers living in home (foreign) in
relation to the world population of skilled workers. The share of unskilled workers residing in
home (foreign) with respect to the world population of skilled labor is denoted by ρ = LH/K
5and (ρ − ρ) = LF/K. The parameter ρ = L/K is the world population of unskilled workers
relative to the world population of skilled labor.
2.2 Preferences and demand
Preferences are homogeneous and are given by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function. The
homogeneous good enters the utility function in the form of the linear extension, whereas the
aggregate of heterogeneous goods enters logarithmically and is modeled as a CES bundle:














α > 0, σ > 1
CX (CA) is the quantity consumed of the heterogeneous aggregate (homogeneous good), σ
measures the elasticity of substitution between any pair of heterogeneous goods and is assumed
to be greater one. The positive parameter α measures the weight of heterogeneous goods in
the utility function. xi (xj) represents the per capita consumption of a domestic (imported)
heterogeneous good. NH and NF stand for the number of domestic and foreign ﬁrms producing
each one variety of the manufacturing good. Households maximize their utility given the budget
constraint deﬁned as follows:












,τ > 1 (2)
P is the optimal CES price index where the price of the domestic (imported) variety is given
by pi (pj). As the homogeneous good is the numéraire, its price is normalized to one. The
parameter τ is greater one and captures the (iceberg) trade costs. The income per household is
given by Y which is W for unskilled and R for skilled labor. Utility maximization with respect
6to quantities consumed yields the following demands and the indirect utility function V :
CX = α/P, CA = Y − α (3)
xi = α p
−σ
i P
(σ−1), xj = α (τpj)
−σ P
(σ−1)
V = Y − αlnP + α(lnα − 1)
To guarantee that both types of goods are consumed, α is assumed to be less than Y 1.
2.3 Production and short-run equilibrium
The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
As the production technology of the numéraire is linear and unskilled labor is the only variable
factor of production, the wage of unskilled workers equals one.
Each variety of the heterogeneous good is produced under increasing returns to scale with a
linear production technology using unskilled labor as the only variable input. To produce one
unit of the good, c units of unskilled labor is needed. Furthermore, one unit of skilled labor is
required as ﬁxed input to produce at all. Firms serve both the domestic and the foreign market.
Exporting goods incurs trade costs which are formalized by iceberg trade costs. Hence, if τx
units are sent away, only x units arrive at the foreign market. Firms aim to maximize their
proﬁt function Π which for ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = (p
H




i − c)(LF + KF) τx
F
i − Ri (4)
The ﬁrst (second) term on the LHS is the demand of the domestic (foreign) market. Maximizing
proﬁts with respect to the prices pH
i and pF









Equilibrium prices are characterized by a constant mark-up over marginal costs (mill pricing).
Due to free market entry and exit of ﬁrms, proﬁts are zero in equilibrium. Setting the equilib-
1As pA is set one, α has to be less than one. See chapter 2.3






where Xi is the aggregate production of variety i. In equilibrium aggregate production has to
be equal aggregate demand by all skilled and unskilled workers. As prices are given by Eq. (5),
the market clearing condition is uniquely determined by:
Xi =
α(σ − 1)(LH + KH)
σc[KH + φKF]
+
α(σ − 1)(LF + KF)φ
σc[φKH + KF]
(7)
where the RHS of Eq. (7) is the aggregate demand from domestic and foreign consumers. φ
measures the freeness of trade and is commonly given by φ = τ1−σ. If trade costs tend to
inﬁnity, φ tends to zero. If trade is costless, φ is one. As Xi is identical for all ﬁrms i, the
subindex of X and R can be omitted. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) and dividing both the
denominator and the enumerator by K yields the equilibrium wage for skilled workers in region







λ + (1 − λ)φ
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φ[(1 − λ) + ρ − ρ]








λ + (1 − λ)φ
+
1 − λ + ρ − ρ
φλ + 1 − λ

Once the goods market equilibrium is determined, the labor market equilibrium can be char-
acterized. The demand for unskilled labor in the manufacturing sector of region H which is
related to the equilibrium aggregate production of each variety X is given by NHcX. Putting
Eq. (6) into this expression yields the following expression for the labor demand of the domestic
manufactoring sector:
L
D = NHRH(σ − 1) (9)
8Unskilled workers who are not employed in the manufacturing sector ﬁnd employment in the
homogeneous good sector. The demand for unskilled labor given by Eq. (9) is assumed to be
less than the regional supply of unskilled labor LH so that in either region both types of goods
are produced. Diﬀerent from Pﬂüger (2004), the regional supply of unskilled is not exogenously
given and ﬁxed. Rather unskilled labor is mobile. In section 3 it is shown that the regional
supply of unskilled labor is a function of trade costs and the geographical distribution of skilled
workers. Taking the mobility of unskilled labor into account, the assumption of regional non-
specialization is fulﬁlled for any given level of trade costs and for any geographical distribution
of skilled labor whenever α < σ/2(σ − 1) and ρ > α(σ − 1)/(σ/2 − α(σ − 1)). Furthermore,
unskilled labor must not too mobile2.
Substituting equilibrium prices from Eq. (5) into the CES- price index yields:
PH = p
∗[λ + (1 − λ)φ]
1
1−σ PF = p




In the long run, skilled and unskilled labor are mobile across regions.
Factor movements of skilled labor are determined by the following equation of motion:
dλ
dt
= (VH − VF)λ(1 − λ) (11)
Consequently, people respond to the diﬀerence in indirect utilities ∆V which is given by using
Eq.(3):
∆V ≡ VH − VF = −α(lnPH − lnPF) + (YH − YF) (12)
2Due to the analytical expression of the labor supply curve the points of intersection between the labor
supply and demand curve cannot be determined analytically. But as both the labor demand and the labor
supply are increasing in λ, it is possible to focus on λ = {0,0.5,1}. At these points the labor supply is always
greater than the labor demand, if the above parameter restriction hold. Assuming that µ, which is a measure
of the mobility costs, is not too small ensures that the labor supply of unskilled workers is greater than the
demand for any λ ∈ [0,1].
9A spatial equilibrium of skilled labor distribution arises when dλ/dt = 0. Using Eq. (8) and
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−
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
= 0 (13)
where ∆VS is the migration incentive of skilled labor. The logarithmic expression captures the
diﬀerence in prices, whereas the second term is the diﬀerence in skilled wages.
Unskilled workers are assumed to have heterogeneous tastes. These tastes are broadly deﬁned
and embrace factors of inﬂuence like preferences about locations or the value of being integrated
in certain social or cultural network as suggested by migration theory. Following Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003), taste heterogeneity can be modeled by a stochastic term 
which is part of the utility function of unskilled labor. Consequently, we have V rj = Vr + rj
where Vr is the indirect utility of region r ∈ [H,F] given by Eq. (3). V rj is the perceived utility
of person j in region r. rj is assumed to be identically and independently Gumbel (i.e., double
exponentially) distributed within the population with a location parameter of 0 and a variance
of π2µ2/6 with π being the circular constant. The parameter µ is a positive scale parameter
and a direct measure of taste heterogeneity. The greater µ, the greater is the variance of tastes.
An unskilled worker settles down in the region where his perceived indirect utility V rj is greatest.
According to Anderson et. al. (1992), the assumptions about the iid random component in the









= ρ/ρ PF − (1 − ρ/ρ) PH (15)
where ρ/ρ is the share of unskilled labor in H with respect to the world population of unskilled
labor. The ﬁrst term on the LHS of Eq. (15) are the gross migration ﬂows from region H
to region F, whereas the second term expresses the gross migration ﬂows from region F to
10region H. A spatial equilibrium arises when d (ρ/ρ)/dt = 0. Net migration ﬂows are then
zero. As the denominators of PH and PH are identical, the equation of motion reduces to
ρ/ρ exp(VF/µ) = (1 − ρ/ρ) exp(VH/µ). Taking the logarithm on both side and rearranging
the expression yields the following condition for spatial equilibria associated with Eq. (15):




∆VU is the migration incentive of unskilled labor in form of the diﬀerence in indirect utilities
given by Eq. (12). The second term on the RHS of Eq. (15) is the migration cost function
K derived from taste heterogeneity. This curve in upward sloping in ρ/ρ and tends toward
(negative) inﬁnity, when ρ/ρ approaches (zero) one. Taking into account that in both regions
unskilled wages are normalized to one and using Eq. (10) in (??), the migration incentive of





λφ + 1 − λ
λ + φ(1 − λ)
(17)
Hence, unskilled labor responds to diﬀerences in price levels which are a function of trade costs
and the distribution of skilled labor. When λ = 0.5, we ﬁnd that ∆VU = 0 for any degree of
trade freeness.
A spatial equilibrium is obtained unambiguously by any combination of λ and ρ which si-
multaneously satisﬁes the conditions given by Eq. (16) and (13). To analyze the stability of
these equilibria I will proceed as follows: In a ﬁrst step (section 3.1), I analyze the eﬀects of a
distributional shock of skilled labor taking into account the reaction of unskilled workers. In
a second step (section 3.2), the eﬀect of a distributional shock of unskilled labor is examined
taking into account the reaction of skilled labor.
3.1 Skilled labor as ﬁrst-mover
In this section skilled workers are assumed to be the ﬁrst-movers. They take the initiative to
deviate from a spatial equilibrium, whereas unskilled workers are assumed to follow. Analyti-
cally, the equilibrium share of unskilled labor for any given distribution of skilled labor is given
11by solving Eq. (16) with respect to ρ:
ρ(∆VU) =
ρ
1 + e exp(−∆VU/µ)
(18)
where ∆VU = ∆VU(λ,φ) as given by Eq. (17). Consequently, we have ρ = ρ(λ,φ). Note that
ρ(∆VU) is a logistic probability function multiplied by ρ. Consequently, when the migration
incentive tends to (negative) inﬁnity, the ratio of unskilled workers in H tends to (0) ρ. If
∆VU = 0, unskilled labor is equally split over both regions. Furthermore, it becomes obvious
that greater levels of taste heterogeneity reduce the willingness to migrate. When µ tends
toward inﬁnity, unskilled labor is immobile and equally spread over both regions for any given
migration incentive. When µ approaches 0, unskilled workers are perfectly mobile so that even
a marginal diﬀerence in indirect utilities induces them to migrate.
Using Eq. (18) in (13) yields the migration incentive of skilled labor taking into the reaction
of unskilled workers ∆VS(λ) = ∆VS(λ, ρ(λ,φ), φ).
3.1.1 Model forces and breakpoint of skilled labor
The symmetric allocation of skilled and, consequently, unskilled labor is always an equilibrium
(∆VS(λ = 0.5) = 0). The stability of this equilibrium is revealed by the sign of the ﬁrst

















where ∆lnP ≡ lnPH −lnPF and ∆R ≡ RH −RF. The ﬁrst two terms of the RHS of Eq. (19)
are known from Pﬂüger (2004) and Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008b). The ﬁrst expression is the
supply linkage. When λ rises the price index in H falls, because more varieties are produced
domestically and do not have to be imported. In F the opposite holds true, which leads to a
greater migration incentive for skilled labor toward H. Following Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008b),
the derivate of ∆R with respect to λ can be decomposed into two diﬀerent forces. Firstly,
holding the individual demand per good constant, an increase in λ leads to a bigger domestic
market and higher proﬁts. This increases the attractiveness of region H (demand linkage by
12skilled labor). Secondly, holding the market size constant, the lower price index in H relatively
increases the price of a variety in region H. Consequently, people demand less units per variety,
which lowers the proﬁt of domestic ﬁrms making the region less attractive (competition eﬀect).
The third term of the LHS of Eq. (19) is novel in the literature and originates in the mobility
of unskilled labor. If unskilled workers were immobile as in standard models (i.e., ∂ρ/∂λ = 0),
the eﬀect would be zero. Here, an increase in λ raises the migration incentive of unskilled
workers as the price index drops in H and rises in F. The gap in regional price levels then
increases the share of unskilled labor residing in H and increases the domestic market. This in
turn raises domestic proﬁts and the wages of the skilled workforce. As the mechanism at work
is equivalent to the demand linkage associated with skilled labor, this new agglomerative force
shall be called demand linkage by unskilled labor. The analytical expressions of the linkages
can be found in appendix A.
Setting Eq. (19) evaluated at symmetry equal to zero and solving it for φ gives the breakpoint
of the model:
φb =
αρ + µρ + µσ − µρσ
αρ + µρ + µσ − µρσ − 2µ(2σ − 1)
(20)
As long as trade costs are greater than the breakpoint (φ < φb), the slope of the diﬀerence in
indirect utilities is negative around λ = 0.5, so that dispersion is stable. For levels of trade
costs less than this threshold (φ > φb), symmetry becomes instable leading to agglomeration
in either region. To guarantee that φb lies between 0 and 1 and, therefore, dispersion is stable
when trade costs are (inﬁnitively) high, two parameter restrictions have to be imposed (no-
black-hole conditions). The necessary condition is that µ has to be greater than α/(σ − 1).
Intuitively, the restriction assures that unskilled labor is not too mobile and, hence, the demand
linkage of unskilled labor not too great. The (dispersive) competition eﬀect is then stronger
than the demand linkage of unskilled workers for any level of trade costs. If µ is smaller than
the critical threshold, complete agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium even for inﬁnitively
high values of trade costs. Once the necessary condition is fulﬁlled, it is suﬃcient to assume
that ρ is greater than µσ/[µ(σ−1)−α]. This assumption guarantees that the competition eﬀect
is strong enough to overcome the agglomeration forces generated by the supply and demand
linkage of skilled labor. The analytical derivation of the no-black-hole conditions can be found
13in appendix A. In comparison to the model without mobile unskilled labor, agglomeration is
induced at higher levels of trade costs. This is intuitive, because mobile unskilled labor adds
an additional agglomeration force.
The comparative statics of the breakpoint are straightforward: ∂φb/∂α < 0 which is due to
stronger agglomerative forces as heterogeneous goods get more weight in the utility function,
∂φb/∂µ > 0 meaning weaker agglomerative forces as the unskilled demand linkage becomes less
important, ∂φb/∂σ > 0 since agglomeration forces become weaker as ﬁrms have less market
power and lower mark-ups over marginal costs. And ﬁnally, we have ∂φb/∂ρ > 0, if the no-black-
hole condition with respect to µ (which is µ > α/(σ − 1)) holds true. The competition eﬀect
then dominates the demand linkage of unskilled labor, so that a greater number of unskilled
labor strengthens the dispersive competition eﬀect.
3.1.2 The bifurcation pattern of skilled labor
Following Grandmont (1988) and Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008a) the type of bifurcation is de-
termined by the sign of the third derivative of ∆VS(λ) with respect to λ evaluated at λ = 1/2
and φ = φb. Furthermore, the second derivative of ∆VS(λ) with respect to λ evaluated at these
points must be zero, which in this model holds true. The third derivative of the diﬀerence of
indirect utilities evaluated at symmetry and φb is given by:
d3∆VS(λ)
dλ3 = −
32αµ(2σ − 1)3[2µ3(ρ + 1)(σ − 1)3σ + α3ρ(2σ − 1) − αµ2ρ(σ − 1)2(4σ − 1)]
[µ(ρ + 1)(σ − 1) − αρ]4(σ − 1)3σ
(21)
Whether this term is positive or negative depends on the sign of the numerator. Rear-
ranging the term in square brackets reveals that it is a linear function in ρ with a slope of
2µ3(σ −1)3σ −αµ2(σ −1)2(4σ −1)+α3(2σ −1) and a positive constant of 2µ3(σ −1)3σ. If µ
is greater than a critical value µcrit, the slope is positive leading to a negative third derivative
irrespectively of ρ (see appendix B for further details). The corresponding bifurcation is a
‘pitchfork’ as in Pﬂüger (2004). Consequently, partial agglomeration is stable and the transi-
tion from dispersion to total agglomeration is smooth and reversible. This situation is shown in
Figure 1. The diagrams on the left represent the evolution of the diﬀerence of indirect utilities
14with respect to falling trade costs (increasing trade freeness), whereas the diagram on the right
is the corresponding bifurcation pattern.
If µ is smaller than µcrit and the number of unskilled labor ρ is greater than a critical amount
ρcrit, the term in square brackets is negative leading to a positive third derivative (see appendix
B). This results in a ‘tomahawk’ bifurcation3. In other words: if unskilled labor is relatively
mobile and the number of unskilled migrants is relatively large, agglomeration forces are strong
leading to a core-periphery pattern and a bang-bang solution as in Krugman (1991). There-
fore, once skilled labor becomes completely concentrated in either region, the model exhibits
hysteresis for increasing trade costs until the sustain point φs with φs < φb is reached. The
utility diﬀerence curves and the corresponding bifurcation pattern are shown in Figure 2.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
The transition from a pitchfork to a tomahawk bifurcation is surprising. If unskilled labor
is relatively mobile (µ < µcrit) and its global stock is close to but smaller than the critical
amount of ρcrit, the wiggle diagram is locally concave around λ = 0.5, but becomes convex
for higher levels of skilled labor agglomeration. This situation is shown in Figure 3. When
trade costs are suﬃciently high, ∆VS(λ) is downward sloping in λ (ﬁgure a). Once trade costs
have fallen below a critical threshold, the diﬀerence of indirect utilities remains concave around
symmetry, but becomes convex at the corners of the interval λ ∈ [0,1]. This allows four
asymmetric equilibria despite the symmetric one and the two corner solutions4. The corner
solutions (total agglomeration) and two interior equilibria (partial agglomeration) are stable,
whereas the symmetric allocation and the remaining asymmetric spatial equilibria are not.
Figures b show this phenomenon. When trade costs continue to fall, ∆VS(λ) is upward sloping
and convex in λ as shown by ﬁgure c. The corresponding bifurcation pattern can be found in
the lower right corner.
[Figure 3 about here]
3Grandmont (1988) calls this kind of bifurcation pattern ‘subcritical’ pitchfork bifurcation. This label is
adopted by several papers. To avoid confusion and to clearly distinguish the ‘subcritical’ from the ‘supercritical’
pitchfork bifurcation, the ’subcritical’ bifurcation is referred to as ‘tomahawk’ whereas the the ‘supercritical’ is
referred to as ‘pitchfork’ bifurcation. For an introduction into bifurcations see Grandmont (1988) or Fujita et.
al. (1999).
4The greatest relevant exponent of λ in d∆VS(λ)/dλ can be shown to be greater than two. Consequently,
more than two extrema may exist leading to more than ﬁve spatial equilibria (incl. corner solutions). In
numerical evaluations no more than four extrema were found.
15When d3∆VS(λ)/dλ3 = 0, the wiggle diagram is locally linear around the symmetric distri-
bution of skilled labor and the breakpoint, leading to catastrophic agglomeration. Unlike in
standard NEG models with immobile labor the local linearity cannot be generalized over the
whole interval of λ ∈ [0,1] and φ ∈ [0,1] as proposed by Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008a). Instead,
the bifurcation pattern is a tomahawk with φs < φb.
3.1.3 The breakpoint and bifurcation pattern of unskilled labor
Once the equilibrium location of skilled workers is determined, the geographical distribution of
unskilled workers can be derived. Figure 4 illustrates the relation between skilled and unskilled
labor agglomeration and trade costs. Diagram I in the lower right corner shows the migration
incentive of skilled labor ∆VS(λ) for λ ∈ [0.5,1] and for a given level of trade costs φ as
introduced by ﬁgures 1 or 2. The equilibrium distribution of skilled labor λ∗ then determines
the migration incentive of unskilled labor ∆VU = ∆VU(λ∗(φ),φ) which is depicted in the upper
right corner (diagram II). Given the migration incentive, the share of unskilled labor residing
in H is uniquely determined in diagram III in the upper left corner.
[Figure 4 about here]
As long as the symmetric allocation of skilled labor is stable, unskilled labor is dispersed, too
(see the bold black lines in ﬁg. 4). When trade costs haven fallen below the breakpoint, skilled
labor agglomeration becomes stable which breaks the symmetric allocation of unskilled labor.
Consequently, the breakpoint of unskilled labor is identical to the breakpoint deﬁned by φb.
The shape of the bifurcation pattern of unskilled workers depends on the pattern of skilled labor
agglomeration. If parameters are such that we observe a pitchfork bifurcation of skilled labor,
partial agglomeration of skilled labor is stable. Falling trade costs then have two opposing













16On the one hand, falling trade costs lead to an increasing share of skilled labor in either region
(compare λ∗(φ1) and λ∗(φ2) in diagram I with φ1 < φ2). Therefore, the gap in regional price
levels widens and increases the migration incentive of unskilled labor. This relocation eﬀect
is captured by the ﬁrst term on the RHS of Eq. (22). Analytically, we have dλ/dφ ≥ 0 and
∂∆VU/∂λ∗ > 0. On the other hand, there is a direct trade costs eﬀect which is expressed by the
second term on the RHS. A lower level of trade costs makes the distance between markets less
important. Consequently, the diﬀerence in regional price levels decreases and unskilled labor
has less incentives to migrate. This is shown in diagram II, where the dotted gray line (which
is ∆VU(φ1)) is below the dotted black line (which plots ∆VU(φ2)). Analytically, we ﬁnd that
sgn(∂∆VU/∂φ) = −sgn(λ∗ − 0.5).
Which of these two eﬀects dominates, depends on the level of trade costs. Around the break-
point and symmetry of skilled labor, the migration incentive ∆VU increases. This holds true
since at symmetry the trade costs eﬀect is zero, whereas the relocation eﬀect is positive. Once
trade costs have fallen below a certain threshold φc, complete agglomeration of skilled labor is
the only stable equilibrium so that falling trade costs reduce the gap in regional price levels,
but leave the equilibrium distribution of skilled labor unchanged. Consequently, the migration
incentive ∆VU decreases leading to a continuous redispersion of the unskilled work force. Such
a situation is shown by the bold gray lines in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows the corresponding
bifurcation pattern of unskilled labor. The parameter φcrit expresses the critical level of trade
costs at which the trade costs eﬀect dominates the relocation eﬀect. From the analysis we can
conclude that φb < φcrit ≤ φc.
[Figure 5 about here]
If parameters are such that we observe a tomahawk bifurcation, the equilibrium distribution
of skilled labor jumps discontinuously from symmetry to complete agglomeration once trade
costs have reached the breakpoint. Consequently, the migration incentive of unskilled labor
discontinuously increases, leading to catastrophic agglomeration of the unskilled workforce.
Note that we do not observe total agglomeration of unskilled labor due to the existence of
migration costs. Falling trade costs then reduce the gap in regional price levels. Hence, ∆VU
becomes smaller inducing a continuous redispersion of unskilled labor. Skilled labor, instead,
17remains agglomerated.
In analogy to skilled labor agglomeration, unskilled labor agglomeration exhibits hysteresis.
Consequently, once catastrophic agglomeration occurred, an increase in trade costs does not lead
to catastrophic redispersion. But diﬀerent from skilled labor hysteresis, the share of unskilled
labor does not remain unchanged. Rather, increasing trade costs widen the gap in regional price
levels, leading to further inﬂows of unskilled labor. These inﬂows of unskilled labor induced by
increasing trade costs come to halt, when trade costs have reached the sustain point φs. At this
point, skilled labor agglomeration becomes instable so that both types of labor catastrophically
remigrate and are equally split over both regions. Figure 6 shows the corresponding bifurcation
pattern of unskilled labor. Appendix C oﬀers the analytical expressions of ρ for a tomahawk
bifurcation pattern of skilled labor.
[Figure 6 about here]
3.2 Unskilled labor as ﬁrst-mover
Diﬀerent from the analysis above, it is now assumed that unskilled labor takes the initiative
to deviate from a spatial equilibrium, whereas skilled labor follows according to its equation
of motion. Consequently, solving Eq. (13) with respect to λ yields λ = λ(ρ/ρ,φ). Using this
expression in Eq. (16) we get G(ρ/ρ) = G(ρ/ρ, λ(ρ/ρ,φ), φ).
The symmetric allocation of unskilled and, therefore, skilled labor is a spatial equilibrium
(G(0.5) = 0). But as before, the symmetric equilibrium does not necessarily have to be sta-
ble. In analogy to the above, diﬀerentiation of G(ρ/ρ) with respect to ρ/ρ and evaluation at














where K denotes the migration cost function as deﬁned by Eq. (16). On the one hand, a
greater stock of unskilled labor leads to higher skilled wages in the immigration region. This in
turn induces skilled labor to follow the unskilled workforce, which widens the gap in regional
price levels and raises the migration incentive of unskilled workers. Analytically, we have
18dλ/d(ρ/ρ) ≥ 0 and d∆VU/dλ > 0. Appendix D oﬀers further analytical details. On the other
hand, the agglomeration force is reduced by migration costs which are increasing in ρ/ρ. Setting
Eq. (23) equal to zero and solving it with respect to φ yields the breakpoint, which is identical
to the breakpoint determined in section 3.1.1. When trade costs are greater (less) than φb, the
symmetric allocation of unskilled and skilled labor is (in)stable.
As the second derivative of G can be shown to be zero, the third derivative of G with respect
to ρ/ρ reveals the type of bifurcation:
d3G
d (ρ/ρ)3 = −
32µ[2µ3(ρ + 1)(σ − 1)3σ + α3ρ(2σ − 1) − αµ2ρ(σ − 1)2(4σ − 1)]
α3ρ(2σ − 1)
(24)
The sign of this expression is uniquely determined by the sign of the numerator. As the
expression in square brackets is identical to the expression in section 3.1.2, the results are
identical. Consequently, if µ is greater than µcrit (deﬁned in appendix B), partial agglomeration
of unskilled and skilled labor is stable, so that the transition from dispersion to agglomeration
is smooth and reversible. The corresponding bifurcation patterns are shown in ﬁgure 5. If µ
is less than µcrit and ρ is greater than ρcrit (see appendix B), the agglomeration of both types
of labor is catastrophic once trade costs have fallen below the breakpoint. Figure 6 shows the
corresponding bifurcation patterns.
4 Conclusion
Allowing skilled and unskilled workers to be mobile in a ‘footloose entrepreneur’ new economic
geography model adds an additional agglomerative force. Besides the (positive) supply and
demand linkage by skilled labor migration and the (negative) competition eﬀect, this paper
identiﬁes a demand linkage by unskilled labor mobility. If unskilled workers migrate from one
region to another, they enlarge the market of the immigration country. The increase in market
size raises the proﬁtability of domestic ﬁrms and thus the wages of skilled labor. If skilled
labor responds to the increase in wages and migrates toward this region, production is shifted.
Consequently, more varieties are produced domestically and do not have to be imported. This
saves trade costs and lowers the domestic price level, whereas the price level in the emigration
19region rises for the same reason. The increasing gap in regional price levels in turn induces
unskilled labor to migrate which leads to the forward-linkage described.
Depending on the level of unskilled labor mobility, the geographical distribution of economic
activity has diﬀerent shapes. If unskilled labor is relatively immobile, the increase in domestic
demand by a relocation of unskilled labor is relatively unimportant compared to the demand
by workers remaining in the distant market. The corresponding bifurcation pattern then is a
pitchfork as proposed by Pﬂüger (2004) and exhibits a smooth transition from dispersion to
total agglomeration. If unskilled labor is relatively mobile, the number of unskilled migrants
will be great even for small migration incentives. Consequently, the aggregate demand in the
immigration region increases signiﬁcantly and compensates the eﬀects of ﬁercer competition.
The corresponding bifurcation pattern then is a tomahawk as in the seminal core-periphery
model developed by Krugman (1991) and agglomeration is catastrophic. If the degree of un-
skilled labor mobility is very high so that the necessary no-black-hole condition is violated,
complete agglomeration of skilled labor is the only stable equilibrium for any level of trade
costs. This is in line with Helpman (1998) and Murata (2003), if these models are considered
without the additional dispersion force.
The transition from a pitchfork to a tomahawk bifurcation is surprising: as shown in section
3.1.2, there exist up to seven equilibria (including border solutions of complete agglomeration).
This diﬀers from what has been worked out by the literature. Robert-Nicoud (2003) shows that
standard NEG models with immobile unskilled labor display at most ﬁve equilibria. Borck and
Pﬂüger (2006) prove that the same holds true in Pﬂüger (2004), which is the underlying model of
the present paper. As the demand linkage by unskilled workers is the crucial diﬀerence between
Pﬂüger (2004) and the model presented here, the reason for the increase in spatial equilibria
must originate in the reaction of skilled labor wages induced by the immigration of unskilled
workers. In Pﬂüger (2004) at medium trade costs the competition eﬀect becomes stronger in
comparison to the agglomerative supply and demand linkage by skilled labor. Consequently,
the diﬀerence in real wages is decreasing in the number of skilled labor for high levels of
agglomeration. Instead, in the model presented the inﬂow of unskilled labor raises the domestic
aggregate income which leads to higher skilled wages. The increase in skilled wages attenuates
the eﬀects of ﬁercer competition and leads to stable partial and total agglomeration equilibria.
20The patterns of the geographical distribution of skilled and unskilled labor are tightly related
to each other. If skilled (unskilled) labor agglomeration is smooth and reversible, then the same
holds true for unskilled (skilled) labor agglomeration. If skilled (unskilled) labor agglomeration
is catastrophic, unskilled (skilled) labor agglomeration will be catastrophic, too. Furthermore,
the model predicts migration ﬂows which depend on the level of economic integration. For
high levels of trade costs, both types of labor are dispersed. Falling trade costs then lead to
synchronous migration ﬂows of both factors of production into the same region. During this
process skilled and unskilled labor migration reinforce each other. During the ongoing process
of economic integration, unskilled labor remigrates to its region of origin while skilled labor
either continues to agglomerate or remains concentrated.
There is another crucial diﬀerence to standard versions of this model. When unskilled labor
is immobile, the unskilled workforce in the periphery is worse oﬀ than unskilled workers in
the agglomeration core. Wages are normalized in both regions, but in the periphery the price
index is higher, because more products have to be imported. In the present approach unskilled
labor can react to this imbalance in indirect utilities by migration. Migration movements
come to a halt when the diﬀerence in indirect utilities equals migration costs. The marginal
migrant then bears migration costs which set oﬀ the beneﬁts of being in the agglomeration
core. Consequently, unskilled workers remaining in the periphery cannot improve their utility
net of migration costs and are no longer worse oﬀ than unskilled labor in the agglomeration
core.
Furthermore, the results of the presented model allow the interesting technical conclusions that
a pitchfork bifurcation can be transformed into a tomahawk by adding an additional agglom-
eration force. This supports the analysis by Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008a). In a generalized
new economic geography model with mobile labor, they identify the absence (Pﬂüger (2004))
or accordingly the existence (Krugman (1991)) of an income eﬀect as the source of the diﬀerent
bifurcation patterns. The model developed in this paper substitutes the agglomerative income
eﬀect by a demand linkage by unskilled labor. The advantage of this model is that the strength
of the unskilled demand linkage can be controlled for and, consequently, replicates a variety of
diﬀerent bifurcation patterns.
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A Model forces and breakpoint




   λ=1/2 =
4α(1 − φ)
(σ − 1)(1 + φ)
> 0 (25)
23• Demand linkage of skilled labor:
∂∆R
∂λ







   λ=1/2,marketsizefixed = −
4α(ρ + 1)(1 − φ)2
σ(1 + φ)2 < 0 (27)







   λ=1/2 =
4α2ρ(1 − φ)2
µ(σ − 1)σ(1 + φ)2 > 0 (28)
Demand linkage of skilled labor and competition eﬀect together - Eq. (26)+Eq. (27):
∂∆R
∂λ
   λ=1/2 = −
4α(1 − φ)[ρ(1 − φ) − 2φ]
σ(1 + φ)2 (29)
This curve is negative for 0 < φ < ρ/(2 + ρ) and greater than zero for ρ/(2 + ρ) < φ < 1





4α(1 − φ)[αρ(1 − φ) + µ(σ − ρ(σ − 1)(1 − φ) + (3σ − 2)φ)]
µ(σ − 1)σ(1 + φ)2 (30)
The model developed by Pﬂüger (2004) arises as a special case for µ → ∞.
To guarantee that dispersion is stable when trade costs are inﬁnitively high, parameters have
be set such that the slope of ∆VS with respect to λ evaluated at symmetry and φ = 0 is less





   λ=1/2 =




The sign of Eq. (31) depends on the sign of numerator. Consequently, the full-form no-black-
hole condition is given by (αρ+µρ−µσρ+µσ) < 0. To understand the role of unskilled labor
mobility, it is of great use to modify this inequality. Assuming α and σ to be given, solving
the full-form no-black-hole condition with respect to ρ reveals the no-black-hole conditions as
stated in the paper:





µ(σ − 1) − α
If µ less than the critical threshold, ρ has to be smaller than a negative value to ensure that
Eq. (31) is negative. Therefore, the condition with respect to µ (ρ) is necessary (suﬃcient).
24B The bifurcation pattern of skilled labor
The slope of the function in ρ can at most have three roots in µ. One root is given by
µ = α/(σ−1). Reducing the slope by polynomial division yields a positively quadratic function








α2(σ(20σ − 12) + 1)
(σ − 1)2σ2 (32)
which is greater than the lower bound of µ = α
σ−1. Straightforward analysis shows that µcrit
is the only relevant root of the slope, if the no-black-hole condition with respect to unskilled
labor mobility holds true.
If µ < µcrit, the total number of unskilled labor ρ has to be greater than
ρcrit ≡ −
2µ3(σ − 1)3σ
2µ3(σ − 1)3σ − αµ2(σ − 1)2(4σ − 1) + α3(2σ − 1)
(33)
to ensure that the linear function in ρ takes on negative values. It can easily be shown that ρ
is greater than the lower bound given by the suﬃcient no-black-hole condition ρ =
µσ
µ(σ−1)−α.
C The geographical distribution of unskilled labor





(σ − 1)(λ∗φ + 1 − λ∗)(λ∗ + (1 − λ∗)φ)
(34)
For λ∗ > 0.5 (λ∗ < 0.5) the trade cost eﬀect is less (greater) than zero.




(σ − 1)(λ∗φ + 1 − λ∗)(λ∗ + (1 − λ∗)φ)
> 0 (35)
If skilled labor agglomeration is catastrophic, the migration incentive and the proportion of
unskilled labor for complete agglomeration of skilled workers (here λ∗ = 1) is analytically given
by:
∆VU(λ





∗ = 1) =
1
1 + φα/[µ(σ−1)] (37)







[α−µ(σ−1)]/[µ(σ−1)] < 0 (38)
D Unskilled labor as ﬁrst mover





αρ(1 − φ)(1 + φ)
σ(λ + (1 − λ)φ)(λφ + 1 − λ)
> 0 (39)
As the migration incentive increases for any given distribution of skilled labor and for any level
of trade costs, from the equation of motion given by Eq. (11) it follows that dλ/d(ρ/ρ) ≥ 0.
Consequently, if skilled labor agglomeration is partial (λ < 1), skilled labor migrates toward H.
Once total agglomeration of skilled labor arises (λ = 1), the proportion of skilled labor remains




   ρ/ρ=1/2 =
ρ(σ − 1)(1 + φ)
ρ(σ − 1)(1 − φ) + 2φ − 3φσ − σ
(40)




ρ/ρ=1/2 = 4µ (41)





4(αρ(φ − 1) − µ(3φσ + σ − ρ(σ − 1)(1 − φ) − 2φ))
3φσ + σ − ρ(σ − 1)(1 − φ) − 2φ
(42)
Note that the expression in Eq. (42) tends toward inﬁnity when φ tends to φP = [σ(ρ −
1) − ρ]/[σ(3 + ρ) − ρ − 2]. This is the breakpoint worked out by Pﬂüger (2004). When φ is
greater than this critical threshold, the sign of Eq. (42) is negative. Consequently, an increase
in unskilled labor would induce outmigration ﬂows of the skilled workforce. Although being
mathematically correct, it contradicts the migration movements determined by the equation of
motion in Eq. (11). Rather, an increase of unskilled labor in either region at levels of trade
trade freeness greater than φP leads to instantaneous total agglomeration of skilled workers in
the same area.
26Figure 1  Pitchfork bifurcation  
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Numerical evaluation for                                        0 = α 0                                     , .5 , .65 , 2 = σ . 20 = μ = ρFigure 2   Tomahawk bifurcation 
 

























































































































































































1969 0. ) ( = φ b  
 
 
Numerical evaluation for  , .5 0 = α , .58 0 = μ . 25 = ρ , 2 = σ 
λ∗Hφ<φbL=0.5 λ∗Hφ1L λ∗Hφ2L λ∗Hφ>φcL=1
λ 0
∆Vs HIL
ρêρ ¯=1 ρêρ ¯=0.5
∆VU HIIIL

































































































Figure 5  Bifurcation pattern of unskilled workers 
Bold  black  lines  show  the  bifurcation  pattern  of  unskilled  workers,  if  skilled  labor 















Figure 6  Bifurcation pattern of unskilled workers 
Bold  black  lines  show  the  geographical  distribution  of  unskilled  workers,  if  skilled  labor 














Numerical evaluation for   , .5 0 = a , .6 0 = m . 200 = r , 2 = s